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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

SALT LAKE CITY,
• Plaintifi/Appeiiee
v.
Case No,, ':^0 0 4 9™CA

CAROLiN KAY,
Defendant/ADDellant

Priority

^.2

BRIEF OF APPELLANT CAROLYN RAY
Appe-'

^"-rr '- ^ud^^r*" =ind corvi ^ ion of Possession of

Drug Paraphernalia,

. siass

L m^suemearu

i

~~-."u.040 of ln^ Fa^f Lakp City Code in the Third Judicial
District Court,

A ne

::u:^i«:

. •-^..

" -*

t Court

Judge, presiding.
"•HE COURT
•~)r. December 21, 1998, Ms. Carolyn Kay entered a conar tic-na^
ras . r\a\ * :^ ' ^~

p^ec

contest on a Class

B misdemeanor charge of possessing drug p^^p::ernu__
v. . •

"

Record Pages
1

-.

?tion n . ^ ^ l ' • r the Salt lake City Code.

See

CKR") at 83--^ .attacnea ...o -.--:_.

.risdiction to review appeals from tf- Third District Court
riminal cases, e x c u

Lotion ~f a first

degree or capital felony, pursuant to Utan ~ode Ann. § io-2a-
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ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Did the District Court err in concluding that the

police were able to point to objective, specific and articulable
facts which warranted a non-consensual investigative seizure of
Ms. Ray?

This issue is a question of law that this Court reviews

nondeferentially for correctness.

See,

e.g.,

State v. Shepard,

955 P.2d 352, 354 (Utah Ct. App. 1998); State v. Humprhrev, 937
P.2d 137, 140 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) .

This issue was preserved for

review in Ms. Ray's Motion to Suppress and Memorandum in Support
of Motion to Suppress at R 18-19, 26-65.
2.

Did the District Court err in concluding that the

police's detention of Ms. Ray was reasonably related in scope to
the report of a suspicious female standing on the corner waiting
for a ride?

This issue is a question of law that this Court

reviews nondeferentially for correctness.
955 P.2d at 354; Humprhrey,

See,

937 P.2d at 140.

e.g.,

Shepard,

This issue was

preserved for review in Ms. Ray's Motion to Suppress and
Memorandum in Support of Motion to Suppress at R. 18-19, 26-65.
3.

Did the District Court err in concluding that the

police did not seize Ms. Ray when they took her driver's license
and retained it while the police department ran a check for
warrants?

This issue is a question of law that this Court

reviews for correctness.

See,

e.g.,

-2-

State v. Bean, 869 P.2d 984,

985 i.

' (Utah C t .

review

App.

i n Ms. R a y ' s

.1.994).

Ilotion

This

issue

t<j S i i p p i e b b

wa<* p r e s e r v e d

.

for

* ' ••

"^cDort

of Motion to Suppress at R. 18-19, 26-65.
4,

in i in 1 mi in I

i n i i n i in

i

i mi in mi

mi i x n c o n c l u d i n g t h a t Ms.

Ray

voluntarily consented to a police search of her belongings?
Because t:.-^ -__;__

*

vf

ps^-d, this issue is a

pure question of law that tnis Court review^ under a correction
ci t:

^^^- -.

.: ; .

1269-""

J: a:

-., Stat_e v. Thurmar., £4^ ?,2d 1256,

''•; ; bean, D C ^ r.<_u ai

ct . .

. ... i . _• 111 * was

n Mb. Ray's Motion ^ •

i m p r e s s and

Memorandum in Support, of Motion to Suppres.

- '

piti^t-.

'• ••-

i -hri.

CITATION TO AUTHORITIES
Constitutional provisions and s tat •-•!'->

M

-il

<w>- HI m

h»-

(\- - -rminative or of central importance to r.tis appeal are as
follows:
United States Constitution, Amendment IV:
The right of tl le people ^- be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized.

institution, Amendment XIV:
Section
law whic:. ._.:.a

No State shall make or enforce any
abridge the privileges or immunities of
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citizens of the United States; nor shall any State
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law; nor deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws.

Utah Constitution, Article I, Section 14:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures shall not be violated; and no
warrant shall issue but upon probable cause supported
by oath or affirmation, particularly describing the
place to be searched, and the person or thing to be
seized.
Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-15
A peace officer may stop any person in a public place
when he has a reasonable suspicion to believe he has
committed or is in the act of committing or is
attempting to commit a public offense and may demand
his name, address and an explanation of his actions.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On May 29, 1998, the Salt Lake City Prosecutor's office
filed an information with the Third District Court charging Ms.
Ray with one count of misdemeanor possession of a drug
paraphernalia in violation of Section 11.20.040 of the Salt Lake
City Code.

See R. at 2.

On August 31, 1998, Ms. Ray moved the

Court to suppress the evidence on which the information was based
on the ground that the Salt Lake City police officer stopped and
detained her without reasonable suspicion or probable cause to
support the stop or arrest in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 77-715.

See R. at 15, 18-19.

Ms. Ray also argued that the officers'

actions violated her rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth

-4-

Amendments to m e

T

United States Constitution and Article

section 14 of the Utah (Jonsti tu I. i. un .

See

/< /

Ms. Ray's Motion r, Suppress came on t : hearing before the
Honorable Les_--. .- - — A,
25.

See

* -•

,4_

K.

. ~ ,

N-

After the police officers v;no interrogated, searched and
* .• ~ :

arresl-- .

tnat nearing, the court requested .

supplemental memoranda on Ms. Ray's motion *~^ suppress.
8;'

.iiTordance with t^° C-,->--H'C; r°auest, Ms. Ray filed

a Memorandum in Support of Motion to Supply
1 Q9R, see

<

ii Lobe' i""f

P. at 26-o3, and an Addendum in Support of Memorandum,

on October 22, 1998.

See R. at • -: - .

.:

. .;.

y

prosecutor filed a Memorandum in Opposition to Ms. Ray's Motion
to
r

+

Suppress on Cotorer . ,

rour4

rial

firs4: ruled that Ms. Pciv's Motion to suppress wuuia be

denit-a en ^ c n . • .

uie court signed

written Findinas of Fact and Conciusjons o: Law to that eirect on
NoveiPit

an Oru-^r f^r™aliv

the motion or. November

Sue

*u, i^^b.

P. -.4 - .

• Criminal Procedure

denying

^rsuan:. \.

i

.e

Ms. Ray entered a

conditional plea or :. , contest on jojemoe:
Q

"- c

ie trial court entered a Sentence, Judgment, Commit merit

Order on tnat same day

' Jm- 1"

5^^ F

>-•* : -2 of appeal on January

7

, 1999.

STATEMEft

i
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See

R. at 91-92.

i ACTS

This case presents a practical reality of police-citizen
interaction: when the police have confiscated and retained a
person's driver's license, official identification card, or other
important papers to run a check for outstanding warrants, the
average reasonable person does not feel that they are free to
walk away until the officers complete the warrants check and
return their papers.
On May 27, 1998, Ms. Carolyn L. Ray purchased several items
at the Quality Quick Stop convenience store in Salt Lake City.
See Transcript of October 6, 1998 Hearing ("Transcript") at 9.1
After completing her purchases, Ms. Ray waited in front of the
store for a prearranged ride.

See

id.

at 3.

Ms. Ray's ride did

not come for some time, so she continued to wait outside the
store for approximately two hours.

See

id at 3, 16.

Rather than

questioning Ms. Ray about her reasons for waiting outside the
store or asking Ms. Ray to leave, the store manager then called
the police to report that Ms. Ray was "suspicious."

See

id.

at

3, 9-10, 15, 26-27.

1

The appellate record contains a transcript of the hearing
on Ms. Ray's Motion to Suppress conducted before Judge Lewis on
October 6, 1998. A stamp on the transcript indicates that it was
received by this Court on March 23, 1999. However, the
transcript has not been numbered as part of the appellate
record's consecutive numbering. Accordingly, for clarity this
brief will refer to the original page numbers indicated on the
transcript.
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Salt Lake City Police officers Jones and Eldard both
responded to the store manage: .- iei
See

xu. at 3--

saw Ms , Pav,

: -p-~. - -

. ..

Officer Eldard arrived at tne store first ana
_

-..-.,•-.

- ~ - ~t
,\>'ee id.

carrying a gun, and in a marked patrol car.
At a IdleL liedj Lin i i in

*

at 10-11.

* i
"
"
.
) suppress, Officers

Eldard and Jones both aamitted that Ms. Ray was committing no
crime

'-a and did not appear to have recently
fKo

committed a crime or to be i ^
See

a t ±u-±j. f

^ x . tfhi *--

+

a c : if prepari:i r ; _

' - ^r-*--- ranaaer told the

dispatcher that he suspecte^
illegal drugs f see id. a:

*-

,

- * *• «- f

:::d later testified that r.e held

that suspicion at the lime :.-_- -.;..•.
he ci1 (

n

r

•

Eldard or Jones.

-•,

- "J Officers

See id. at r

her identification.
. i;

. -

..

(::... : •

,

.

'-ommunicate that or any other particularized

suspicions

.

. • .

v

. 19-^.0, :c.

* - ' i ,; •
:

':\~y and asked her to produce

ee la

I In

Pay gave Officer Eldaid

-*•-,-..- . dentification card, whi^h *' -ficer Eldard reviewed

and then retained as he contactea nis r ; .
a check for outstandi ng warrants.
As Officer ;i

.i .. waited

IMI

See

id.

- :

.. ..
,

-Ft

11-12
• ::----f for a

warrants check, Officer Jones, who was also in uniform ana :~ ^
markea par-

* :

.ick Stop.
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See

ia.

at

12, 20.

Officer Jones began interrogating Ms. Ray, asking if she

had anything in her bags that she shouldn't have.
16, 21-22.

Ms. Ray responded that she did not.

See
See

id.

id.

at 5,
Officer

Jones then asked if he could look in Ms. Ray's bags and she gave
him permission.

See

id.

Officer Jones then searched Ms. Ray's

bags, producing two spoons wrapped in plastic with burn marks on
the bottom and two syringes.

See id.

at 6, 17.

Officer Jones

placed Ms. Ray under arrest and searched her person incident to
that arrest, revealing a glass pipe with a filter in one end.
See

id.

at 18.

at 7.

Ms. Ray denied that the items were hers.

See

id.

The officers cited Ms. Ray for misdemeanor possession of

drug paraphernalia in violation of section 11.20.040 of the Salt
Lake City Code and released her.

See

id.

at 7.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Both Utah and Federal law recognize that Officer Eldard
seized Ms. Ray when he took her driver's license and retained it
to run a non-consensual search for outstanding warrants.

Utah

law also recognizes that Officer Eldard's actions would have
constituted a seizure of Ms. Ray even if he had not retained her
license because a reasonable person does not feel free to walk
away when a police officer requests a warrants check and is
obviously waiting for the results of the check.

While requesting

a warrants check and requiring the suspect to remain to learn its
results is permissible if the police have a reasonable,

-8-

articulable suspicion that the suspect has or is about to commit
a crime, the record in this case is devoid of any facts known to
the officers which would create such a reasonable suspicion.
Since officers improperly seized Ms. Ray without any
reasonable, articulable suspicion that she had or was about to
commit a crime, the law holds that the officers may not rely on
the consent to search that they obtained during the period of the
illegal detention.

Accordingly, since the officers' search of

Ms. Ray violated her state and federal constitutional rights, the
trial court erred in refusing to suppress the evidence that was
the fruit of that illegal search.
ARGUMENT
I.

The Officers' Search of Ms. Ray Viola-bed the Fourth and
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and
Article I, Section 14 of the Utah Constitution Because the
Officers Could Not Point to Objective, Specific and
Articulable Facts Which Warranted Their Non-consensual
Investigative Seizure of Ms. Ray.
A.

Officer Eldard Seized Ms. Ray When He Took Her
Identification and Retained It.

The Utah courts have established a three-level analytic
framework for analyzing police encounters with the public.

In a

level one encounter, "an officer may approach a citizen at [any
time] and pose questions so long as the citizen is not detained
against his will."

State v. Deitman, 739 P.2d 616, 617 (Utah

1987) (quoting United States v. Merritt, 736 F.2d 223, 230 (5th
Cir. 1984)).

In a level two encounter, "an officer may seize a

-9-

person if the officer has an ^articulable suspicion' that the
person has committed or is about to commit a crime; however, the
^detention must be temporary and last no longer than is necessary
to effectuate the purpose of the stop.'"

Id.

In a level three

encounter, "an officer may arrest a suspect if the officer has
probable cause to believe an offense has been committed or is
being committed."

Id.

In State v. Struhs, 940 P.2d 1225, 1227 (Utah Ct. App.
1997), this Court clarified the distinction between a level one
encounter (a consensual encounter) and level two encounter (a
seizure requiring an objectively reasonable and articulable
suspicion).

This Court stated that "[t]he distinction between a

level one encounter . . . and a level two encounter . . . depends
on whether, through a show of physical force or authority, a
Id.

person believes his freedom of movement is restrained."
This Court emphasized that this is an objective test:

"[A]

seizure occurs only if, in view of all the circumstances
surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed
that he was not free to leave."

Id.

This Court has also

cautioned that this test for determining when a person is seized
is judged from the point of view of the average, reasonable
citizen, not from the police officer's point of view:

"The test

for when [a] seizure occur[s] is objective and depends on when
the person reasonably feels detained, not on when the police

-10-

officer thinks the person is no longer free to leave."

Bean,

869

P.2d 984, 986 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) (quoting State v. Ramirez, 817
P.2d 774, 786 (Utah 1991)).
Applying this objective test to this case, it is clear that
Officer Eldard effectuated a level two encounter before Officer
Jones even arrived at the Quality Quick Stop.

When Officer

Eldard arrived, Ms. Ray was waiting outside the store.
Transcript at 4.

Although

See

both Officer Eldard and Officer Jones

admitted that Ms. Ray was committing no crime when they arrived
and did not appear to have recently committed a crime or to be in
the act of preparing for a crime, see id.

at 10-11, 21, Officer

Eldard immediately asked Ms. Ray to produce her identification
then kept that identification while his dispatcher ran a search
for outstanding warrants.

See

id.

at 4-5.

At the hearing on Ms.

Ray's motion to suppress, Officer Eldard did not testify that he
obtained Ms. Ray's consent to retain her identification or to
wait while he ran a warrants check.

See id.

He simply

approached Ms. Ray in full police uniform, asked her to produce
her identification, and then retained that identification without
any further consent from Ms. Ray.

See

id.

It is well-established under both Utah and federal law that
Officer Eldard seized Ms. Ray at the moment he elected to retain
her identification to run an involuntary warrants check.
have universally recognized that, when a police officer

-11-

Courts

confiscates and retains a person's identification or other
important documents, the person is seized because a reasonable
person does not feel that she is free to walk away and leave her
documents with the officer.

See,

e.g.,

Florida v. Rover, 460

U.S. 491, 501-03 (1983); United States v. Lee, 73 F.3d 1034, 1040
(10th Cir.1996); Lambert,

46 F.3d at 1068; United States v.

Werkinq, 915 F.2d 1404, 1408 (10th Cir.1990).

Rather, as this

Court has stated, a reasonable person feels that she is "not free
to leave" when an officer confiscates and "continue[s] to hold
[her] papers."

State v. Godina-Luna, 826 P.2d 652, 654 (Utah Ct.

App. 1992).
The Tenth Circuit has recently reemphasized this rule,
stating that:
In Terry stops and routine traffic stops, courts have
consistently held that undue retention of a defendant's
documents renders the encounter nonconsensual.
See
Florida
v. Royer,
460 U.S. 491, 501-03, 103 S.Ct. 1319,
75 L.Ed.2d 229 (1983); United States v. McKneelv, 6
F.3d 1447, 1451 (10th Cir.1993). In a Terry stop or
routine traffic stop, an officer's retention of a
defendant's documents is significant because it
indicates that the defendant, as a general rule, did
not reasonably feel free to terminate the encounter
and, therefore, the government cannot rely on the
defendant's consent to justify further detention,
questioning, or a search.
State

v.

Burch,

153 F.3d 1140, 1143 (10th Cir. 1998).

Accord

United States v. Jordan, 958 F.2d 1085, 1087 (D.C.Cir.1992)
(stating that, in Florida v. Rover, the United States Supreme
Court "recognized that abandoning one's driver's license . . .
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is

simply not a practical or realistic option"); United States v.
Walker, 933 F.2d 812, 817 (10th Cir.1991) ("[T]he encounter in
this case was clearly not consensual.

Officer Graham retained

the defendant's driver's license and registration during the
entire time he questioned the defendant."); United States v.
Cordell, 723 F.2d 1283, 1285 (7th Cir. 1983) (holding that a
seizure occurred when a police officer handed a defendant's
license and ticket to another officer and continued questioning
the defendant); United States v. Thompson, 712 F.2d 1356, 1359
(11th Cir. 1983) (holding that police questioning of a person
while in his car "matured into" a seizure when the police
retained the defendant's driver's license after examining it);
United States v. Waksal, 709 F.2d 653, 660 (11th Cir. 1983)

("We

fail to see how appellant could have felt free to walk away from
police officers when they still possessed [his ticket and
driver's license].").
In Jordan,

the D.C. Circuit noted the universal recognition

of this rule, stating that the D.C. Circuit has
considered on several occasions the effect on citizens
stopped by the police of being asked to hand over
critical identification or travel documents and having
the police retain them while questioning ensues, noting
that xonce the identification is handed over to police
and they have had a reasonable opportunity to review
it, if the identification is not returned to the
detainee [it is] difficult to imagine that any
reasonable person would feel free to leave without it.'
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Jordan,

958 F.2d at 1087 (quoting United States v. Battista, 876

F.2d 201, 205 (D.C. Cir. 1989)).
In the initial hearing on Ms. Ray's Motion to Suppress,
Officer Eldard recognized the reality on police-citizen
interaction that underlies these decisions from the Utah and
Federal courts.

In response to a query whether Ms. Ray was free

to leave while Officer Eldard held her identification, Officer
Eldard responded "I guess the fact that I had her I.D. might have
caused her to wait."

See Transcript at 12.

In this case, a reasonable person in Ms. Ray's position
would not have felt that she was free to leave while Officer
Eldard retained possession of their her identification.
Accordingly, as Utah and federal courts have recognized, Officer
Eldard seized Ms. Ray when he retained her identification after
briefly examining it.
B.

Even if Officer Eldard Had Not Taken and Retained Ms.
Ray's Identification, His Actions Would Still Amount to
a Seizure of Her Person Because an Average, Reasonable
Person Would Not Feel Free to Walk Away While an
Officer was Conducting a Check for Outstanding
Warrants.

In determining whether a person has been seized by police
conduct, both Utah and federal courts consider the totality of
the circumstances surrounding the police-citizen interaction.
See,

e.g.,

United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980)

(holding that a person is seized if "in view of all of the
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circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would
have believed that he was not free to leave."); State v. Johnson,
805 P.2d 761, 762 (Utah 1991); Godina-Luna,

826 P.2d at 655.

Under that standard, Officer Eldard's retention of Ms. Ray's
identification was not the only action which seized Ms. Ray.

He

also seized her when he initiated an involuntary check for
outstanding warrants.
In State v. Johnson, 805 P.2d at 762, the Utah Supreme Court
agreed with this Court's conclusion that "a seizure within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment occurred *when [an officer] took
[a defendant's] name and birth date and expected her to wait
while he ran a warrants check."

Id.

(quoting State v. Johnson,

771 P.2d 326, 327 (Utah Ct. App. 1989)).

This rule is simply a

straightforward application of the test for determining when a
person is seized.

An objective, reasonable person would simply

not feel that they are free to end their encounter with a police
officer and depart when the officer has requested a check for
outstanding warrants and is obviously waiting for the results of
that check.

See,

e.g.,

Johnson,

805 P.2d at 762;

State v.

Hansen, 837 P.2d 987, 988 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) (reversing a trial
court's conclusion that running a warrants check did not
constitute a seizure for Fourth Amendment purposes).
Of course, police officers are justified in running a check
for outstanding warrants and requiring the suspect to remain for
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a reasonable time when they are involved in a level two
encounter.

The Utah courts have held that, once a level two stop

is made, "the detention

x

must be temporary and last no longer

than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop.'''

Salt

Lake City v. Smoot, 921 P.2d 1003, 1007 (Utah Ct. App. 1996)
(quoting State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127, 1132 (Utah 1994)).

Under

this standard, "running a warrants check does not exceed the
scope of the [level two] detention

y

so

long as it does not

significantly extend the period of detention beyond that
reasonably necessary' . . .
initial stop."

Id.

to effectuate the purpose of the

(quoting Lopez,

873 P.2d at 1133).

However,

as discussed in the following section, the record demonstrates
that Officers Eldard and Jones did not have a reasonable,
articulable suspicion that Ms. Ray had been or was about to be
involved in criminal activity.
21.

See, e.g., Transcript at 10-11,

Accordingly, Officer Eldard's decision to seize Ms. Ray

violated her rights under the Fourth Amendment of the United
States Constitution and Article I, Section 14 of the Utah
Constitution.

Officer Eldard's actions also violated Utah Code

Ann. § 77-7-15.
C.

The Record is Devoid of Any Indication that Officers
Jones and Eldard Knew Any Objective, Articulable Facts
on Which to Base a Reasonable Suspicion at the Time
Officer Eldard Seized Ms. Ray.

Office Eldard's level two seizure of Ms. Ray would have been
justifiable if he were aware of sufficient objective, articulable
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facts to give rise to a reasonable suspicion before he effected
the seizure.

Both Utah and federal courts have held that an

officer may effectuate a level two seizure if he is able to point
to specific, objective and articulable facts that would lead a
reasonable person to believe that the defendant has or is about
to commit a crime.

See, e.g., Deitman,

739 P.2d 616, 617.

However, the record is devoid of any indication that either
Officer Eldard or Officer Jones were aware of any such objective,
articulable facts prior to the time Officer Eldard confiscated
Ms. Ray's identification and initiated a warrants check.

In

fact, the only facts that the officers knew at the time Officer
Eldard seized Ms. Ray were (1) that the store manager had
reported that a "suspicious" female had waited outside the store
for two hours after making some purchases, and (2) that Officer
Eldard had seen Ms. Ray standing in front of the store, and (3)
that Ms. Ray appeared "nervous" when a fully uniformed police
officer with a marked police car and gun approached her and began
to ask her questions.

See Transcript at 3-5, 8-10.

Of course, a

person's feeling that a suspect is "suspicious" or their
knowledge that a person has waited in a public place for two
hours is not sufficient to raise a reasonable suspicion of
criminal wrongdoing.

See, e.g., Godina-Luna,

826 P.2d at 655

hunch, without more, does not raise a reasonable articulable
suspicion regardless of the final result").
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If it were, the

("a

police would be able to require any person who stands in the same
place for too long to surrender their identification and wait
while the police ran a check for warrants.

Moreover, this Court

has held that "the fact that [a] defendant[] [appears] nervous
Id.

does not raise a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity."

Accordingly, the facts that the officers knew at the time Officer
Eldard seized Ms. Ray are not sufficient to give rise to a
reasonable suspicion of criminal wrongdoing.
As noted above, Officers Eldard and Jones admitted that Ms.
Ray was committing no crime when they arrived and did not appear
to have recently committed a crime or to be in the act of
preparing for a crime.

See Transcript at 10-11, 21.

The record

shows that Officer Eldard seized Ms. Ray immediately after his
arrival, when he took and retained her identification.
at 4.

See

id.

It is therefore clear that Officer Eldard was not aware of

any objective, articulable facts to support a reasonable
suspicion that Ms. Ray had or was about to commit a crime at the
time he effected a level two seizure of her person.
D.

Because the Officers Improperly Seized Ms. Ray Without
Any Reasonable, Articulable Suspicion That She Had or
Was about to Commit a Crime, the Officers May Not Rely
on the Consent to Search That They Obtained During the
Period of the Illegal Detention.

Although Ms. Ray consented to a search of her property, she
gave that consent after Officer Eldard took and retained her
license and after he initiated the warrants check.
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See

Transcript at 3-5.

As the foregoing discussion demonstrates, Ms.

Ray's consent was therefore obtained during an illegal detention.
This Court has previously stated that, "to be
constitutionally valid, a search consent following illegal police
behavior must be both non-coerced and not arrived at by
exploitation of the primary police illegality."
See also

808 P.2d 141, 151 (Utah Ct. App. 1991).
P.2d 1256, 1262-64 (Utah 1993).

State v. Sims,
Thurman,

846

Because Ms. Ray's consent to

search her bags was obtained during an unconstitutional
detention, the government bears this heavy burden of showing that
"the consent was (1) voluntary, and (2) not obtained by
exploitation of the prior illegality."
655.

Godina-Luna,

826 P.2d at

"Evidence obtained in searches following police illegality

must meet both tests to be admissible."

State v. Arroyo, 796

P.2d 684, 688 (Utah 1990) (citing 3 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure
§ 8.2(d), at 190 (2d ed. 1987)).

See also

Thurman,

846 P.2d at

1262-63.
1.

Officer Jones' Search of Ms. Ray Exploited Officer
Eldard's Prior Illegal Seizure of Her Person.

"The principle underlying the exploitation test is that the
Fourth Amendment should not permit law enforcement to

A

ratify

their own illegal conduct by merely obtaining a consent after the
illegality has occurred.'" Thurman,
Arroyo,

796 P.2d at 689) .

846 P.2d at 1263 (quoting

"The factors to be* considered in an

exploitation analysis include temporal proximity of the
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illegality and the consent, the presence of intervening
circumstances, and the purpose and flagrancy of the official
misconduct."

Godina-Luna,

846 P.2d at 1262.

826 P.2d 652, 655.

See

also

Thurman,

In this case, those factors clearly

demonstrate that the police exploited Ms. Ray's illegal detention
to obtain her consent to search.

First, the temporal proximity

of the illegal seizure and Ms. Ray's grant of consent to search
her bags was immediate.

The record shows that Officer Eldard had

taken Ms. Ray's driver's license and was in the act of running
the check for warrants when Officer Jones began interrogating her
and then asked for consent to search.
12, 20.

See Transcript at 3-5, 11-

There was no lapse in time between the illegal seizure

of Ms. Ray's person and the request for consent to search--in
fact, that seizure had just occurred and was ongoing.

See

id.

Second, as one would expect with such close temporal
proximity between the illegal police conduct and the request for
consent, the record contains no references to any intervening
circumstances which would purge the request for consent of its
illegal taint.

In fact, the only circumstance that occurred

between Officer Eldard's seizure of Ms. Ray and her grant of
consent to search was the arrival of a second uniformed officer
in a marked police car and the initiation of an interrogation.
See Transcript at 20.

This intervening circumstance only

aggravated the illegality of Ms. Ray's seizure: she certainly did
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not feel "free to go" when Officer Jones was interrogating her
and Officer Eldard had her license and was running a check for
warrants.
Finally, the "purpose" of Officer Eldard's seizure of Ms.
Ray was clearly to detain her while the officers searched every
avenue to find some inculpatory evidence against her.

The

officers admitted that Ms. Ray had not committed a crime when
they arrived at the Quality Quick Stop and that there was no
indication of pending or past illegality.
11, 21.

See Transcript at 10-

In fact, Officer Eldard testified that his sole purpose

in going to the Quality Quick Stop was to find out why Ms. Ray
was waiting in front of the store after purchasing her items.
See Transcript at 10.

The government does not contend that Ms.

Ray's waiting in a public place was illegal, and the police
therefore were investigating perfectly legal citizen conduct.
The officers' detention of Ms. Ray while they ran a warrants
check were therefore a fishing expedition for evidence of some
crime that Ms. Ray may have committed at some time.

The

"purpose and flagrancy" factor [of the exploitation test]
directly relates to the deterrent value of suppression."
Thurman,

846 P.2d at 1263 (citing Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S.

590, 608-12 (Powell, J., concurring)).

Given the fact that the

Utah and federal courts have clearly ruled on several occasions
that the police may not retain a citizen's identification in a
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level two seizure without reasonable suspicion that the suspect
has or is about to commit a crime, and given the fact that the
officers' conduct in this case directly violated those rulings,
the evidence seized in this case must be suppressed to send a
clear deterrent message; the police may not ignore this court's
rulings and hope that a subsequent consent to search will
validate their illegal actions.
For the foregoing reasons, the government has failed to meet
its burden of showing that the consent that the officers obtained
from Ms. Ray did not exploit her prior illegal detention.

Since

the government must show both that the consent was involuntary
and that it did not exploit their prior illegal conduct,
Godina-Luna,

826 P.2d at 656; Arroyo,

see

796 P.2d at 688, the trial

court's denial of Ms. Ray's Motion to Suppress should be reversed
on this point alone.
2.

Ms. Ray's Consent to Search was not Voluntarily

Given.
While the police officers' exploitation of Ms. Ray's seizure
is sufficient alone to merit a reversal of the trial court's
ruling, that ruling should also be reversed because the
government cannot show that Ms. Ray's consent to search was
voluntary.

Thurman,

846 P.2d 1262 ("If the court determines that

the consent was not voluntary, no further analysis is required:

-22-

the consent is invalid, and the proffered evidence must be
excluded.").
"Voluntariness is primarily a factual question."

Id.

(citing Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 248-49 (1973)).
Accordingly, while a trial court's ultimate conclusion that a
consent was voluntary or involuntary is reviewed nondeferentially
for correctness, a trial court's underlying factual findings will
not be set aside unless they are found to be clearly erroneous.
Id.

at 1271.

depends on

"[W]hether the requisite voluntariness exists

x

the totality of all the surrounding

circumstances--both the characteristics of the accused and the
details o f
Schneckloth,

police conduct."

Arroyo,

796 P.2d at 689 (quoting

412 U.S. at 226).

In this case, a number of facts and circumstances point to a
conclusion that Ms. Ray's consent to search her bags was not
voluntarily given.

As the foregoing discussion illustrates,

Officer Eldard seized Ms. Ray by confiscating and retaining her
identification prior to the time that Officer Jones obtained her
consent to search.

The Utah Supreme Court has said that the

prosecution's burden of showing voluntariness "is ^particularly
heavy' when the defendant's consent was obtained while he or she
was in custody."

State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1219 (Utah 1993).

While the fact that Ms. Ray had been seized is not enough,
standing alone, to reach the conclusion that her consent to
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search was involuntary, see

id.,

the record also shows that the

officers used an unusual show of force in responding to a report
of a woman waiting in a public area.

Such a show of force is a

factor in concluding that the police obtained a consent to search
by duress or coercion.

See,

e.g.,

State v. Archuleta, 925 P.2d

1275, 1278 (Utah Ct. App. 1996).

As noted above, Officer Eldard

was the first officer to arrive at the Quality Quick Stop.
Transcript at 3-5, 20.
question her.

See

id.

See

He approached Ms. Ray and began to
at 3-5.

Officer Eldard was wearing what

he described as a "[b]adge, gun, the whole works."

Id.

at 11.

Officer Eldard took Ms. Ray's identification and called for a
warrants check, see

id.

at 3-5, which surely must have frightened

Ms. Ray and led her to believe that she was in trouble.
Immediately thereafter, Officer Jones arrived in a marked police
car.
id.

He also approached Ms. Ray and began questioning her.
at 21-22.

See

In these circumstances, the officers'

assertiveness and the presence of their marked cars, uniforms and
guns, together with their questioning, confiscation of Ms. Ray's
identification and initiation of a warrants check, created a
clear atmosphere of coerciveness that would lead a reasonable
person to believe that she was not free to decline an officer's
request to search her belongings.
The evidence obtained by Officer Jones while searching Ms.
Ray's bags should be suppressed as fruit of the poisonous tree.
-24-

See,

e.g.,

Katz v. United States, 399 U.S. 347, 357 (1967); Wong

Sun v. United States, 372 U.S. 471, 484 (1963).

See

also

Lee, 73

F.3d at 1040 ("In this case, Deputy Barney possessed Mr. Lee's
driver's license and Mr. Lacy's identification card and rental
documents at the time he asked permission to search the vehicle.
Therefore, Deputy Barney's request to search the car was not a
consensual encounter because the Defendants

A

would not reasonably

have felt free to leave or otherwise terminate the encounter'
with Deputy Barney because their documents had not been
returned.") (quoting Lambert,

46 F.3d at 1068).

Accordingly, the

trial court's denial of Ms. Ray's Motion to Suppress should be
reversed.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the trial court erred in holding
that the police did not violate Ms. Ray's state and federal
constitutional rights.

This Court should reverse and remand with

instructions to grant Ms. Ray's Motion to Suppress.
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ADDENDUM A

THIRD DISTRICT COURT - SLC COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UT

k

SALT LAKE CITY,
Plaintiff,

MINUTES
CHANGE OF PLEA
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMT]

vs.

Case No: 981910831 MO

CAROLYN L RAY,
Defendant.
Custody: Salt Lake County Jail

Judge:
Date:

LESLIE LEWIS
December 21, 1998

PRESENT
Clerk:
chells
Prosecutor: DON WARNER
Defendant
Defendant's Attorney(s): JEFFREY W. HALL
DEFENDANT INFORMATION
Date of birth: August 19, 1960
Video
Tape Number:
11:21 am
CHARGES
1. USE OR POSSESSION OF DRUG PARAPHERNALIA - Class B Misdemeanor
Plea: No Contest - Disposition: 12/21/1998 No Contest
A copy of the Information is given to the defendant.
The Information is read.
Court advises defendant of rights and penalties.
Defendant waives time for sentence.
SENTENCE PRISON
Based on the defendants conviction of USE OR POSSESSION OF DRUG
PARAPHERNALIA a Class B Misdemeanor, the defendant is sentenced to

Page 1

t;

•

Case No: 981910831
Date:
Dec 21, 1998
SENTENCE JAIL
Based on the defendant's conviction of the following:
USE OR POSSESSION OF DRUG PARAPHERNALIA MB the defendant is
sentenced to a term of 6 month (s) The total time suspended for
this case is 6 month(s).

SENTENCE JAIL CONCURRENT/CONSECUTIVE NOTE
This case is consecutive to Judge Thome and Judge Quinn cases.
Total Fine: $171.13
Total Suspended: $0
Total Surcharge: $145.46
Total Amount Due: $316.59
ORDER OF PROBATION
The defendant is placed on probation for 2 year(s).
Probation is to be supervised by ALCOHOL COUNSELING ED CENTER.
The imposition of sentence is stayed and the defendant is placed on
probation.
Defendant is to pay a fine of 171.13 where the surcharge has been
added to the fine.
Pay fine to The Court.
PROBATION CONDITIONS
Usual and ordinary conditions required by the Department of Adult
Probation & Parole.
Submit to searches of person and property upon the request of any
Law Enforcement Officer.
Do not use, consume or possess alcohol or illegal drugs, nor
associate with any people using, possessing or consuming alcohol or
illegal drugs.
Submit to tests of breath and urine upon the request of any Law
Enforcement Officer.
Participate in and complete any educational; and/or vocational
training as directed by the Department of Adult Probation and
Parole.
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Case No: 981910831
Date:
Dec 21, 1998
Violate no laws.
Submit to drug testing.
Not frequent amy place where drugs are used, sold, or otherwise
distributed illegally.
Refrain from the use of alcoholic beverages.
Pay $300.00 recoupment fee. Payments to be determined by ACEC.
Obtain GED.
Complete Ave Day program.
HIV testing within 30 days.
Be drug tested today. Random drug testing 1 time per week.
Read AA Big Book in 6 months.
Attend 2 AA meetings per week for duration of probation, in
addition to the day program.
Can have 2 years to pay fine.
Robert Eldard, Kevin Jones, and Rory Boehner proffer their
testimony. The Court orders a $1,000.00 fine plus am 85% surcharge
to be paid. The fine is stayed pending successful completion of
probation.
REVIEW HEARING is scheduled.
Date: 06/25/1999
Time: 08:30 a.m.
Location: Fourth Floor - N44
THIRD DISTRICT COURT
450 SOUTH STATE
SLC, UT 84111-1860
Dated this 3 \

day of
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Case No: 981910831
Date:
Dec 21, 1998
In compliance with the Americans with Disabilities Act, individuals
needing special accommodations (including auxiliary communicative
aids and services) during this proceeding should call Third
District Court at 238-7300 at least three working days prior to the
proceeding. The general information phone number is (801)238-7300.
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